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This paper examines how population aging in°uences the sustainability
of public debt in an overlapping generations model with unfunded social
security. We show that population aging increases the government's
risk of bankruptcy and negatively a®ects economic growth when the
population growth rate is su±ciently low. We also show that social
security reform reduces the government's risk of bankruptcy and positively
a®ects economic growth.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops an overlapping generations model of growth and
public debt according to the model suggested by BrÄauninger (2005), and
then uses this framework to analyze the economic impact of population
aging and social security reform. The situation considered here is that
an aging population causes a heavy burden of social security payments,
while social security tax alone would not be su±cient to ¯nance such
payments fully. Public debt is introduced in order to supplement this
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balance. In such a situation, we examine how population aging in°uences
the sustainability of public debt and economic growth. Furthermore,
the economic impact of social security reform will also be examined.
The present analysis is motivated by two important issues in Japan,
population aging and government budget de¯cits. Population aging is
triggered by a rise in life expectancy and a decline in the fertility rate.
According to demographic projections by the United Nations Population
Division, the old-age dependency ratio (the share of the total population
aged 65 and over) in Japan is expected to grow from 19.7% in 2005 to
37.7% in 2050, while the working population share (the share of the total
population aged 15{64) is expected to decline from 66.4% in 2000 to
51.1% in 2050. 1) In addition, the public debt in Japan exploded after
the collapse of the \bubble economy". According to OECD Economic
Outlook 2006, the debt/GDP ratio in Japan increased from 74.7% in
1993 to 177.6% in 2007. Because the Japanese public pension scheme
is based on a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, population aging leads to
a greater burden of social security payments on younger generations.
In addition, as stressed by Ono (2003), because the social security
payments are partly funded by the state budget, government de¯cits and
social security ¯nance are closely related to each other. Therefore, this
paper constructs a growth model that explicitly incorporates unfunded
social security and public debt, and analyzes how population aging
and social security reform in°uence the sustainability of public debt.
Note that population aging is a common feature of developed countries.
Many developed countries also employ pay-as-you-go pension schemes.
Moreover, most developed countries have experienced continual budget
de¯cits since the mid 1970s. Therefore, the implications of this paper
1) Source: The World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population
Database.
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are also applicable to many other developed countries.
Existing studies such as Pecchenino and Polland (1997), Pecchenino
and Utendorf (1999), and Futagami and Nakajima (2001) analyzed
unfunded social security and population aging in economic growth
models. However, these studies did not consider the issue of public debt
explicitly. Previous studies such as Chalk (2000), BrÄauninger (2005)
and Yakita (2008) examined the sustainability of public debt using an
overlapping generations model. For example, BrÄauninger (2005) employed
a Romer (1986) type endogenous growth model and showed that there
is a critical de¯cit{GDP ratio. If the de¯cit{GDP ratio is below the
critical level, there exists a stable steady-growth path. However, if the
de¯cit{GDP ratio is above the critical level, the bond-¯nanced de¯cit
is not sustainable. However, these studies do not consider the issue of
social security explicitly. To my knowledge, Gertler (1997) and Ono
(2003) are two exceptional analytical studies that explicitly considered
both the issues of social security and public debt. Gertler (1997), who
modi¯ed the Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989) framework, analyzed
social security as ¯nanced by public debt. Ono (2003) analyzed a social
security policy with public debt using a Diamond (1965) type overlapping
generations model. However, these studies employed neoclassical growth
models. Thus they cannot examine the growth e®ects of population aging
and social security reform. Moreover, they did not focus their attention
on the sustainability of public debt. Therefore, this paper extends
a BrÄauninger (2005) type endogenous growth model by introducing
unfunded social security and examines how population aging and social
security reform in°uence economic growth and the welfare of agents.
The main ¯ndings of this paper are as follows. First, population
aging caused by the decline in the population growth rate increases
the government's risk of bankruptcy, while a reduction in the old-age
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pension bene¯t contributes to the sustainability of public debt. Second,
population aging caused by the decline in the population growth rate
negatively a®ects economic growth when the population growth rate
is low, but it positively a®ects economic growth when the population
growth rate is high. In addition, a reduction in the old-age pension
bene¯t positively a®ects economic growth.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
basic model. Section 3 shows how population aging or a reduction
in the old-age pension bene¯t in°uences the sustainability of public
debt. In Section 4, we examine how population aging or a reduction in
the old-age pension bene¯t in°uences the long-run growth rate of the
economy. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
We consider a one-sector, endogenous growth model with unfunded
social security. In each period t, a new generation, called generation t, is
born and is composed of a continuum of Nt > 0 units of identical agents.
The population growth rate is assumed to be constant at n 2 (¡1;1)
and satis¯es Nt = (1 + n)Nt¡1. Agents in this economy live for two
periods, youth and old age. In each period t, there exist only two
generations, the active working young and the retired old. Therefore,
the share of old dependents relative to the young working population
in period t is given by Nt¡1
Nt
= 1
1+n
. Thus, population aging would be
triggered if there were a decrease in the population growth rate n.
Agents derive utility from their own consumption in both youth and
old age. Thus, the lifetime utility of the agent in generation t is
expressed as:
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ut = ln c1;t + ¯ ln c2;t+1; (1)
where c1;t and c2;t+1 denote the consumption when young and old, and
¯ is a time discount rate.
In youth, each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, works
inelastically, and obtains wage income. An agent in generation t divides
his or her wage income wt between his or her own current consumption
c1;t, savings st, and the payment of social security taxes ¿twt, where
¿t is the rate of social security tax levied on wage income. In old
age, agents retire and consume their returns on savings (1+ rt+1)st and
social security bene¯ts zt+1.
Thus, the lifetime budget constraints of the agent in generation t are:
c1;t + st = (1¡ ¿t)wt; (2)
c2;t+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + zt+1: (3)
By maximizing (1), subject to (2) and (3), we obtain:
st =
¯
1 + ¯
(1¡ ¿t)wt ¡ 1
1 + ¯
zt+1
1 + rt+1
: (4)
This saving equation states that higher social security bene¯ts zt+1 and
tax rate ¿t imply lower savings.
Each ¯rm has constant returns-to-scale technology, and the aggregate
production function is expressed as Yt = F (Kt; EtNt), where Yt, Kt,
and Nt denote the aggregate levels of output, physical capital, and labor
input, respectively. Et represents labor productivity, which is assumed
to be driven by Romer-type spillovers that emanate from accumulated
investment per worker. In order to ensure the existence of a long-run
growth path, it is assumed that Et takes a particular form as follows:
Et =
1
a
Kt
Nt
= kt
a
, where kt ´ Kt=Nt and a is a positive technological
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parameter. Representing the production function in e®ective per capita
terms, y^t = f(k^t), where y^t ´ Yt=EtNt, k^t ´ Kt=EtNt, and noting that
y^t = f(a) and k^t = a hold, we obtain the optimal condition for a
representative ¯rm as:
½t = f
0(a) = ½; (5)
wt =

f(a)¡ f 0(a)a
a

kt = ¹wkt; (6)
where ½ ´ f 0(a) and ¹w ´ f(a)¡f 0(a)a
a
. Because the market for capital is
competitive, the following arbitrage condition holds:
1¡ ± + ½t+1 = 1 + rt+1 = 1 + r; (7)
where ± is the depreciation rate of capital. Because ½t+1 is constant at
½, the rate of return on savings rt+1 is also constant at r.
The government in this economy can impose a social security tax, ¿t,
on wages. Moreover, it can issue public debt with a one-period maturity
in order to ¯nance social security payments. The government funds the
expenditure of social security and the repayment of debt with tax receipts
and with the revenue from the newly issued debt. Thus the government
budget constraint in period t is given byDt+1+¿twtNt = ztNt¡1+(1+rt)Dt.
With regard to the left-hand side, Dt+1 is the revenue from debt issue,
while ¿twtNt is the revenue from social security tax. With regard to the
right-hand side, ztNt¡1 represents the social security payments, while
Dt is the value of public debt maturing during period t, and rt, is the
rate of return. Dividing both sides by Nt, we obtain:
(1 + n)dt+1 + ¿twt =
zt
1 + n
+ (1 + rt)dt; (8)
where dt ´ DtNt .
We assume that the government provides unfunded social security
using a de¯ned bene¯t scheme. Under the de¯ned bene¯t scheme, there
are two forms of social security payments. One is a lump sum transfer
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where the payments for old agents in generation t¡1 are a ¯xed constant
zt = z. The other is a transfer based on a replacement rate for wages,
where the payments for old agents in generation t ¡ 1 are calculated
using a replacement rate for the next generation's wages zt = Áwt, where
Á 2 [0; 1) denotes the replacement ratio. In the theoretical analysis,
the former (a lump sum) payment scheme is the general assumption.
However, in the real world, many developed countries employ the latter
payment scheme characterized by a strong link to current wages. In
order to maintain the living standards of the elderly, the pension bene¯ts
are adjusted taking into account not only price changes (i.e., price
indexation) but also wage changes (i.e., wage indexation). For example,
in Japan, the pension bene¯t level of a salaried worker is set to exceed
approximately 50% of the wages of the current working population.
Therefore, the replacement ratio is about 50%. In our paper, we focus
upon the role of wage indexation and assume that the payments for old
agents in generation t ¡ 1 are calculated using a replacement rate for
the next generation's wages zt = Áwt. Existing studies such as Meier
(2000) and Brooks (2002) also employ an analogous assumption. 2)
We also assume that the government employs the following ¯scal
rule concerning newly issued debt: Dt+1 ¡Dt = ÃYt, where Dt+1 ¡Dt
expresses the budget de¯cit in period t. The government borrows a
speci¯ed fraction Ã of national income Yt and tries to maintain the
budget de¯cit{GDP ratio constant at Ã. 3) This type of ¯scal policy
2) Another reason for the assumption zt = Áwt is purely technical. This
assumption makes the analysis of this paper employing an endogenous growth
model with unfunded social security easier.
3) An alternative ¯scal rule is that the government sets a constant tax rate, ¿ ,
and issues public debt to ¯nance the remaining social security expenditure and
the repayment of debt. Provided that this alternative ¯scal rule is employed,
the analytical property of the model is mostly unchanged.
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is employed in the EU and other OECD countries. Existing studies
such as BrÄauninger (2005) and Yakita (2008) also employ an analogous
assumption. Dividing both sides by Nt leads to:
(1 + n)dt+1 = dt + Ãyt; (9)
where yt ´ YtNt , and the relations yt = f(a)kt = ( ¹w + ½)kt hold.
Under these social security and ¯scal policies, the tax rate is
adjusted endogenously to maintain the social security expenditure and
the repayment of public debt. From (5){(9) and zt = Áwt, the social
security tax rate ¿t is given by:
¿t =
Á
1 + n
+
r
¹w
xt ¡ Ã

1 +
½
¹w

; (10)
where xt ´ dtkt . Equation (10) states that a lower population growth
rate n, a higher replacement ratio Á, and a higher debt{capital ratio
xt imply a higher social security tax rate.
Now let us consider the market equilibrium conditions. Noting that
an arbitrary opportunity exists between a real asset and bond, we can
set the market clearing condition for capital as: Kt+1 +Dt+1 = stNt,
which expresses the equality of the total savings by young agents in
generation t, stNt, to the sum of the stocks of aggregate physical capital
and aggregate public debt. Dividing both sides by Nt leads to:
(1 + n)(kt+1 + dt+1) = st: (11)
The commodity market clears automatically according to Walras's law.
2.2 Equilibrium
This subsection characterizes the competitive equilibrium allocation
of the economy. By inserting yt = ( ¹w + ½)kt into (9), we obtain the
dynamic evolution of the debt{labor ratio, dt, as:
dt+1
dt
=
1
1 + n

1 + Ã( ¹w + ½)
1
xt

´ dg(xt): (12)
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Let us denote the right-hand side of (12) as dg(xt). Moreover, by
inserting (4){(7), (10),(12) and zt = Áwt into (11), we obtain the dynamic
evolution of the capital{labor ratio, kt, as:
kt+1
kt
=
1
1 + n+ 1
1+¯
Á ¹w
1+r

¯
1 + ¯
(1¡ Á
1 + n
) ¹w ¡ (1 + ¯
1 + ¯
r)xt ¡ Ã( ¹w + ½)
1 + ¯

´ kg(xt): (13)
Let us denote the right-hand side of (13) as kg(xt). The dynamics of
the model are completely described by these two di®erence equations.
Because the evolutions of the debt{labor ratio, dt, and the capital{labor
ratio, kt, depend upon the debt{capital ratio, xt, the evolution of xt
is given by:
xt+1
xt
=
dt+1
dt
kt+1
kt
=
dg(xt)
kg(xt)
: (14)
Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the conditions
that xt+1 = xt = x or:
1 + g = dg(x) = dk(x): (15)
From (12) and (13), in the steady-state equilibrium, the state variable
kt and dt grow at the same rate g. Hereafter, we denote the path
on which the state variable kt and dt grow as the same rate as the
balanced growth path, and denote the growth rate g de¯ned in equation
(15) as the balanced growth rate.
3 Steady state
In this section, we examine the existence and the stability of the
steady-state equilibrium. Then, we also examine how population aging
or a reduction in the old-age pension bene¯t in°uences the sustainability
of public debt.
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3.1 Existence of the steady-state equilibrium
This subsection examines the existence of the steady-state equilibrium.
As discussed in Section 2-2, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized
by equation (15). From (12) and (13), equation (15) is rewritten as:
LH(x;n; Á) = RH(x); (16)
where
LH(x;n; Á)
´ 1 + n
1+n+ 1
1+¯
Á ¹w
1+r

¯
1+¯
(1¡ Á
1+n
) ¹w¡(1+ ¯
1+¯
r)xt¡Ã( ¹w+½)
1+¯

;
and
RH(x) ´ 1 + Ã( ¹w + ½) 1
xt
:
From (16), we can easily con¯rm that @LH
@x
< 0, limx!0 LH(x) < 1,
limx!1 LH(x) = ¡1, @RH@x < 0, limx!0RH(x) =1, limx!1RH(x) >
0. In addition, regarding the left-hand side of (16), @LH
@n
> 0 and
@LH
@Á
< 0 hold. To stress these relationships, we denote the left-hand
side of (16) as LH(x;n; Á) and the right-hand side of (16) as RH(x)
respectively. Figure 1 illustrates LH(x;n; Á) and RH(x) for given values
of n and Á. 4) From (16), regarding the existence of the steady-state
equilibrium, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Regarding the existence of the steady-state equilibrium,
the following statements hold.
(1) There is a critical population growth rate n^. If the population
growth rate n is above the critical level n > n^, then there are
4) Following BrÄauninger (2005) and Yakita (2008), we mainly focus our attention
on the regions where the debt{capital ratio xt is positive. However, this
is only for clarity of explanation. Even if we consider the case where the
debt{capital ratio xt is negative, the results of this paper do not change at
all.
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Figure 1: Existence of equilibria
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two steady states, E1 and E2, where E1 is characterized by a
lower debt{capital ratio x1, and E2 is characterized by a higher
debt{capital ratio x2. In these steady states, 0 < x1 < x2, dx
1
dn
< 0
and dx
2
dn
> 0 hold. If the population growth rate n is below the
critical level n < n^, then there is no steady state. Only at n = n^
is there a unique steady-state equilibrium.
(2) There is a critical replacement ratio Á^. If the replacement ratio Á
is below the critical level Á < Á^, then there are two steady states,
E1 and E2 where E1 is characterized by a lower debt{capital ratio
x1, and E2 is characterized by a higher debt{capital ratio x
2. In
these steady states, 0 < x1 < x2, dx
1
dÁ
> 0 and dx
2
dÁ
< 0 hold. If the
replacement ratio Á is above the critical level Á > Á^, then there is
no steady state. Only at Á = Á^ is there is a unique steady-state
equilibrium.
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The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. Proposition 1-1
indicates that there exist two steady states, E1 and E2, when the
population growth rate n is su±ciently high. As described in Figure 1,
the decline in the population growth rate n shifts the function LH(x)
downwards and thus increases the value of x1, and lowers the value of
x2. However, if the population growth rate n declines further, LH(x)
and RH(x) may not intersect any more. In this case, there is no steady
state. Therefore, there is a critical population growth rate n^. If the
population growth rate n is above the critical level n > n^, then there
are two steady states. However, if the population growth rate n is
below the critical level n < n^, then there is no steady state.
Proposition 1-2 also indicates that there exist two steady states, E1
and E2, when the replacement ratio Á is su±ciently low. As again
described in Figure 1, an increase in the replacement ratio Á shifts
the function LH(x) downwards and thus increases the value of x1 and
lowers the value of x2. However, if the replacement ratio Á is increased
further, LH(x) and RH(x) may not intersect any more. In this case,
there is no steady state. Therefore, there is a critical replacement ratio
Á^. If the replacement ratio Á is below the critical level Á < Á^, then
there are two steady states. However, if the replacement ratio Á is
above the critical level Á > Á^, then there is no steady state.
3.2 Stability of the steady-state equilibrium
This subsection examines the stability of the steady-state equilibrium.
As discussed in Section 2-2, the dynamics of the model are completely
described by equations (12), (13) and (14). Figure 2 depicts equations
(12) and (13), when there exist two steady states, E1 and E2. Figure
3 depicts equation (12) and (13), when there is no steady state. We
denote the right-hand side of equation (12) as dg(xt), and the right-hand
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side of equation (13) as kg(xt), respectively. From (12), (13) and (14),
regarding the stability of the steady-state equilibrium, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 . Suppose there are two steady states, E1 and E2, and
the steady state E1 characterized by a lower debt{capital ratio, x
1, is
locally stable, whereas the steady state E2 characterized by a higher
debt{capital ratio, x2, is unstable.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B. The intuition
of proposition 2 is explained as follows. From Figure 2, the relation
kg(xt) > dg(xt) holds when x
1 < xt < x
2. In this region, because the
capital{labor ratio kt grows faster than the debt{labor ratio dt, the
debt{capital ratio xt decreases monotonically (i.e.,
xt+1
xt
< 1). However,
when xt < x
1 or xt > x
2, the relation kg(xt) < dg(xt) holds. In these
regions, the debt{labor ratio dt grows faster than the capital{labor ratio
Figure 2: Two steady-states
dg(xt),kg(xt)
x0
x1
dg(xt)
kg(xt)x2
1
1+n
E1
E2
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kt, and the debt{capital ratio xt increases monotonically (i.e.,
xt+1
xt
> 1).
Therefore, if the initial debt{capital ratio x0 is below the critical level
x2, the debt{capital ratio gradually converges to the steady state x1.
Thus steady state E1 characterized by the lower debt{capital ratio x
1
is locally stable. However, if the initial debt{capital ratio x0 is above
the critical level x2, the debt{capital ratio xt increases monotonically,
and the level of the capital{labor ratio kt decreases from (13) and
will go to zero within a ¯nite number of periods. Once the level
of the capital{labor ratio kt becomes zero, there is no commodity in
the economy, so the value of government debt vanishes. Thus such a
situation can be regarded as government bankruptcy.
Figure 3 illustrates the case where there exists no steady state. In
this case, as shown in Figure 3, the relation dg(xt) > kg(xt) holds for
all xt > 0. Thus, regardless of the initial debt{capital ratio x0, the
debt{capital ratio xt increases monotonically (i.e.,
xt+1
xt
> 1), and the
level of the capital{labor ratio kt decreases from (13) and goes to zero
within a ¯nite number of periods. Hence, the economy always rides on
the path to bankruptcy.
Summarizing the results obtained in Sections 3-1 and 3-2, we obtain
the following results.
Result 1 Regarding the sustainability of the bond-¯nanced de¯cit, the
following statements hold.
(1) The bond-¯nanced de¯cit is sustainable when the population growth
rate n is su±ciently high to satisfy n > n^ and the initial debt{capital
ratio x0 is su±ciently low to satisfy x0 < x
2.
(2) The bond-¯nanced de¯cit is sustainable when the replacement ratio
Á is su±ciently low to satisfy Á < Á^ and the initial debt{capital
ratio x0 is su±ciently low to satisfy x0 < x
2.
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Figure 3: No steady-state
dg(xt),kg(xt)
x0
dg(xt)
kg(xt)
1
1+n
These results are summarized as follows. The bond-¯nanced de¯cit is
not sustainable when there is no steady state. From Proposition 1, the
existence of the steady-state equilibrium is assured when the population
growth rate n is su±ciently high to satisfy n > n^ or the replacement
ratio Á is su±ciently low to satisfy Á < Á^. However, these are not
su±cient conditions for the sustainability of public debt. As shown in
Proposition 2, the initial debt{capital ratio x0 plays a crucial role. In
order to prevent government bankruptcy, the initial debt{capital ratio
x0 must be su±ciently low to satisfy x0 < x
2. Therefore, a su±ciently
high population growth rate n, a su±ciently low replacement ratio Á and
a su±ciently low initial debt{capital ratio x0 are su±cient conditions
for the sustainability of public debt.
3.3 Population aging and social security reform
In this subsection, we examine brie°y how population aging caused by
the decline in the population growth rate n in°uences the sustainability
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of public debt. We also examine how a reduction in the old-age pension
bene¯t caused by the decline in the replacement ratio Á in°uences the
sustainability of public debt.
Let us ¯rst examine the e®ect of population aging. From Proposition 1-
1, a lower population growth rate n is less likely to satisfy the condition
n > n^, which ensures the existence of the steady-state equilibrium.
Moreover, a lower population growth rate n decreases the critical value
of x2, as shown in Proposition 1-1, and shrinks the regions of the
initial debt{capital ratio x0 where the economy can ride on the balanced
growth path. Therefore, population aging caused by the decline in the
population growth rate n increases the government's risk of bankruptcy
by enlarging the burden of social security expenditure and the repayment
of public debt.
Next, let us consider the e®ect of a reduction in the old-age pension
bene¯t. From Proposition 1-2, a lower replacement ratio Á is more
likely to satisfy the condition Á < Á^, which ensures the existence of
steady-state equilibrium. Moreover, a lower replacement ratio Á increases
the critical value of x2 as shown in Proposition 1-2 and expands the
region of the initial debt{capital ratio x0 where the economy can ride on
the balanced growth path. Therefore, a reduction in the old-age pension
bene¯t caused by the decline in the replacement ratio Á contributes
to the sustainability of public debt by mitigating the burden of social
security expenditure and the repayment of public debt.
4 Long-run growth
Section 3 shows that population aging increases the government's
risk of bankruptcy, while a reduction in the old-age pension bene¯t
contributes to the sustainability of public debt. In this section, we focus
on the case where the economy is in a stable steady-state equilibrium
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E1, and we analyze the long-run growth e®ects of these policies. We
examine how population aging caused by a decline in the population
growth rate n in°uences the balanced growth rate g. We also examine
how a reduction in the old-age pension bene¯t caused by the decline
in the replacement ratio Á in°uences the balanced growth rate g.
4.1 Population aging
This subsection examines the long-run growth e®ect of population
aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate n. As shown in
Section 2-2, the balanced growth rate g is described by (13), (15) and
(16). However, because the debt{capital ratio, x1, is determined by a
somewhat complicated form of the implicit function shown in (16), it is
di±cult to investigate the growth e®ect of n analytically. Therefore, in
this subsection, we provide some numerical examples. In the numerical
simulation, we specify the production function as Yt = AK
®
t (EtNt)
1¡®.
Figure 4 depicts numerical examples of the relationship between the
population growth rate n and the balanced growth rate g under alternative
values of Á. The parameters used in the baseline simulations are given in
footnote 5.5)The ¯gures show that there is a hump-shaped relationship
between the population growth rate n and the balanced growth rate
g.6) These results indicate that the growth e®ect of population aging
caused by the decline in the population growth rate n is positive when
the population growth rate n is high but that it could be negative
when the population growth rate is low. These results are intuitively
explained as follows.
5) ® = 0:25, A = 16, a = 1, ± = 1, Ã = 0:03, ¯ = 1, n = 0,Á = 0:3.
6) Note that the balanced growth rate is de¯ned only when the population
growth rate n is su±ciently high to satisfy n > n^. For example, the Á = 0:3
line in Figure 4 suggests that the critical population growth rate when Á = 0:3
is ¡0:025.
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Figure 4: Relationship between n and g
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Equation (13) indicates that the decline in the population growth rate
n has two negative e®ects and one positive e®ect on capital accumulation.
The ¯rst negative e®ect is the \tax increase e®ect". Equation (10)
implies that the decline in the population growth rate n positively
a®ects the tax rate ¿ in the following two ways. First, the decline in
n increases the dependency ratio 1
1+n
, which positively a®ects the tax
rate. Second, the decline in n increases the debt{capital ratio x1 as
shown in Proposition 1-1, which positively a®ects the tax rate. These
two positive e®ects of the decline in n on ¿ decrease the net labor
earnings and savings of agents and thus negatively a®ect the capital
accumulation. The second negative e®ect is the \substitution e®ect from
physical capital to public debt". Proposition 1-2 shows that the decline
in n increases the debt{capital ratio x1. This increase in the debt{capital
ratio implies a shift in savings from physical capital to public debt.
Thus this substitution e®ect negatively a®ects the capital accumulation.
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The one positive e®ect is the \antidissolving e®ect". From (11), the
decline in n increases the ratio of old to young in the population, which
mitigates the dissolving of savings into a larger workforce st
1+n
. Thus
this antidissolving e®ect positively a®ects the capital accumulation
From (13) and (16), it is easy to guess that the e®ect of the decline
in n is likely to be negative when n is extremely small (i.e., n! ¡1).
Because the ratio of old to young in the population is already large, the
positive dissolving e®ect caused by the decline in n becomes negligible.
However, because the social security tax rate is already high because of
the high dependency ratio and the high debt{capital ratio, any increase
in social security tax caused by the decline in the population growth rate
n provides a considerable negative impact upon capital accumulation.
Therefore, when n is extremely small, the negative tax reduction e®ect
and substitution e®ect are likely to dominate the positive antidissolving
e®ect. On the other hand, the e®ect of the decline in n is likely
to be positive when n is extremely large (i.e., n ! 1). Because the
ratio of old to young in the population is already small, the positive
antidissolving e®ect caused by the decline in n becomes more crucial.
However, because the social security tax rate is already low because of
the low dependency ratio and the low debt{capital ratio, any increase in
social security tax caused by the decline in the population growth rate
n provides a fairly small negative impact upon capital accumulation.
Therefore, when n is extremely large, the positive antidissolving e®ect is
likely to dominate the negative tax reduction e®ect and the substitution
e®ect.
Therefore, these numerical examples suggest that population aging
caused by the decline in the population growth rate may not only
increase the government's risk of bankruptcy but also decrease the rate of
capital accumulation and the balanced-growth rate when the population
growth rate n is su±ciently low.
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4.2 Social security reform
This subsection examines the long-run growth e®ect of a reduction
in the old-age pension bene¯t caused by a decline in the replacement
ratio Á. The balanced growth rate g is again described by (13), (15)
and (16). From (13), (15) and (16), regarding the e®ect of Á on g, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 . In the stable steady state E1,
dg
dÁ
< 0 holds.
The proof of Proposition 3 is simple. By di®erentiating (13) with
respect to Á and noting dx1
Á
> 0 from Proposition 1-2, we can easily
con¯rm that the relation dg
dÁ
< 0 holds. Proposition 3 shows that the
decline in the replacement ratio Á increases the balanced growth rate.
Equation (13) indicates that the decline in the replacement ratio Á has
three positive e®ects on capital accumulation. The ¯rst positive e®ect
is the \tax reduction e®ect". Equation (10) implies that the decline in
Á negatively a®ects the tax rate ¿ in the following two ways. First, the
decline in Á decreases the level of social security expenditure, which
negatively a®ects the tax rate. Second, the decline in Á lowers the
debt{capital ratio x1 as shown in Proposition 1-2, which negatively
a®ects the tax rate. These two negative e®ects of the decline in Á
on ¿ increase the net labor earnings and savings of agents and thus
positively a®ect the capital accumulation. The second positive e®ect is
the \substitution e®ect from public debt to physical capital". Proposition
1-2 shows that the decline in Á lowers the debt{capital ratio x1. This
reduction in the debt{capital ratio implies a shift in savings from public
debt to physical capital. Thus this substitution e®ect positively a®ects
the capital accumulation. The third positive e®ect is the \incentive
e®ect". The decline in Á implies the reduction in the old-age pension
bene¯t. Thus, it motivates agents to save more for their old age, which
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positively a®ects the capital accumulation.
Therefore, we can con¯rm that a reduction in the old-age pension
bene¯t caused by the decline in the replacement ratio Á not only
contributes to the sustainability of public debt but also increases the
rate of capital accumulation and the balanced-growth rate.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examined how population aging in°uences the sustainability
of public debt in an overlapping generations model with unfunded social
security. We showed that population aging increases the government's
risk of bankruptcy and negatively a®ects economic growth when the
population growth rate is su±ciently low. We also showed that social
security reform reduces the government's risk of bankruptcy and positively
a®ects economic growth.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We denote the value of x such that satis¯es the condition
@LH
@x
= @RH
@x
as xM . From (16), we can easily con¯rm that
xM = (
RH2
LH1LH3
)1=2 where LH1 ´ 1+n1+n+ 1
1+¯
Á ¹w
1+r
, LH3 ´ 1 + ¯1+¯ r
and RH2 ´ Ã( ¹w + ½). Since limx!0 LH(x) < limx!0RH(x) and
limx!1 LH(x) < limx!1RH(x), the following three cases might occur,
RH(xM ) < LH(xM ), RH(xM ) = LH(xM ), and RH(xM ) > LH(xM ).
We denote RH(xM ) < LH(xM ) as case1, RH(xM ) = LH(xM ) as case
2, and RH(xM ) > LH(xM ) as case 3 respectively.
If RH(xM ) < LH(xM ) (i.e. case 1), as shown in Figure 1, the
function RH(x) and LH(x) have necessarily two intersections, so there
are two steady-states, x1 and x2. If RH(xM ) = LH(xM ) (i.e. case 2),
the function RH(x) and LH(x) are just tangent at xM and there is a
unique steady-state. If RH(xM ) > LH(xM ) (i.e. case 3), RH(x) and
LH(x) do not intersect and therefore there is no steady-state.
Now notice that @LH
@n
> 0. Hence, an increase in population growth
rate n increases LH(x). Therefore, if the population growth rate n is
su±ciently high to satisfy n > n^, the situation called case 1 occurs and
there will be two steady-states, x1 and x2. However, if the population
growth rate n is su±ciently low to satisfy n < n^, there will be no
steady-state. Then critical value of n^ is de¯ned as the value of n which
yields the situation called case 2.
In addition, by di®erentiating (16) with respect to n, we obtain
dx
dn
= ¡
@LH
@n
@LH
@x
¡ @RH
@x
:
Since @LH
@n
> 0 and 0 > @LH
@x
> @RH
@x
at x1 (0 > @RH
@x
> @LH
@x
at x2) as
shown in Figure 1, we can easily con¯rm that dx
1
dn
< 0 ( dx
2
dn
> 0) holds.
Moreover, notice that @LH
@Á
< 0. Hence, an increase in replacement
ratio Á decreases LH(x). Therefore, if the replacement ratio Á is
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su±ciently low to satisfy Á < Á^, the situation called case 1 occurs and
there will be two steady-states, x1 and x2. However, if the replacement
ratio Á is su±ciently high to satisfy Á > Á^, there will be no steady-state.
Then critical value of Á^ is de¯ned as the value of Á which yields the
situation called case 2.
In addition, by di®erentiating (16) with respect to Á, we obtain
dx
dÁ
= ¡
@LH
@Á
@LH
@x
¡ @RH
@x
:
Since @LH
@Á
< 0 and 0 > @LH
@x
> @RH
@x
at x1 (0 > @RH
@x
> @LH
@x
at x2), we
can easily con¯rm that dx
1
dÁ
> 0 ( dx
2
dÁ
< 0) holds.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
By di®erentiating (14) with respect to xt, we obtain
dxt+1
dxt
=
@dg
@xt
xt
kg
+
dg
kg
¡ dg
kg
xt
kg
@kg
@xt
:
Close to the steady-state, we have dg = kg and xt+1 = xt = x, so the
di®erential simpli¯es to
dxt+1
dxt
= 1 +
x
kg

@dg
@x
¡ @kg
@x

:
From Figure 2, the relation @dg
@x
< 0, @kg
@x
< 0 and 0 > @kg
@x
> @dg
@x
(0 > @dg
@x
> @kg
@x
) hold at x1 (x2). Therefore, dxt+1
dxt
< 1 holds at x1 and
dxt+1
dxt
> 1 holds at x2. Hence x1 is locally stable, whereas x2 is unstable.
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